The structure of the scientific revolution [ edit ]

**The Structure of Scientific Revolutions**
	File:Structure-of-scientific-revolutions-1st-ed-pb.png Cover of the first edition
The author	Thomas S. Kuhn
Cover design	Ted Lacey
publisher place	United States
Language	English
Publishers	University of Chicago Press
Publication date	1962 (50th Anniversary Edition: 2012)
medium	Print ( Hardcover andPaperback )
Page number	264
ISBN	9780226458113
Dewey classification	501
LC classification	Q175.K95
	History of science

" Structure of Scientific Revolutions " (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) , 1962 published; reprinted in 1970; English abbreviated as SSR), is an American history of science at home and philosophy of science at home Thomas Kuhn 's book. The publication of this book is a milestone in sociology of history, philosophy, and scientific knowledge; it has triggered continuous and extensive assessments and repercussions both inside and outside academia. Conne challenged the mainstream view of "normal science" at the time. The course of normal science is thought to be “accumulated and developed” by recognized facts and theories, and he believes that there is another pattern of periods in which cumulative science is interrupted in contrast to normal science. The “abnormal phenomenon” discovered in the course of scientific innovation has led to a new paradigms, and then used this paradigm to question the new problems of old data, surpassing the simple “mysteries” of previous paradigms, changing research rules and guiding new research. map".

For example, Kuhn for the Copernican Revolution analysis (Copernican Revolution) emphasized: Copernicus proposed the heliocentric at the beginning, and the Ptolemaic geocentric system of comparison, astronomical events such as the orbital position of the planets, and there is no more accurate Prediction. Instead, it calls for some researchers to develop better and simpler solution bases in the future. Comn refers to the core concept of a superior innovation as its "paradigm," making this word widely used analogously in the second half of the 20th century. Conne insisted that the paradigm shift was a synthesis of the research community, enthusiasm, and commitment to science, rather than a definitive logic program, and his statement caused a loss. In the postscript of reprinting in 1969, he described his definition and relationship with the model.

Some of the comments made on the Book of Coon include: introducing realistic humanism to the core of science; while other comments are: Comn introduces irrational elements into the greatest achievements of science, tarnishing its lofty nature.

1content
2history
3Summary
- 3.1 Thebasic method
- 3.2Historical examples of chemistry
- 3.3 TheCopernican Revolution
- 3.4Coherence
- 3.5stage
- 3.6Unavailability
- 3.7paradigm
4Kuhn's opinion on scientific progress
5Influence
- 5.1Physics
- 5.2Sociology
- 5.3Economics
- 5.4Political Science
6reviews
- 6.1Paradigm concepts
- 6.2Paradigm irreducibility
- 6.3Unavailability and Perception
7Awards and honors
Version8
9See
10annotations
11References
12external links

Content [ edit ]

The main concept paradigm shift (Paradigm shift), incommensurability (Incommensurability, or translation of incommensurable)

History [ edit ]

The structure of the scientific revolution was originally a topic in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, and was published by the University of Chicago Press in 1962. In 1969, Conne added his response to the first edition of the controversy in his postscript. The 50th Anniversary Edition (an introduction article with Hackin) was published by the University of Chicago Press in April 2012.

The origins of Comun's retrospective writing, when he was still a graduate student at Harvard University in 1947, was asked to teach postgraduates in the humanities, a science course focusing on historical cases. Kuhn later said that "until that time, I did not read old scientific documents." Aristotle 's physics is amazing, different from Newton 's concepts of matter and movement. He wrote: "... When I read it, Aristotle appears to be not only ignorant about mechanics but also a bad physicist. Especially with regard to sports, his works for me, logic Both observations and observations seem to be filled with equally serious mistakes.” When reading Aristotle’s physics, Conne’s point of view is: This is clearly contradictory to the fact that Aristotle had a brilliant mind. . In order to take a good look at Aristotle's reasoning, people must be aware of the scientific practices of the time. His conclusion is that the concept of Aristotle is not worse than Newton, or it is different. This view is the basis of the structure of the scientific revolution.

Prior to the publication of this book by Conne, many thoughts have been raised about the process of scientific research and discovery. Ludwig Flake in his book: The origin and development of scientific facts, put forward the first system of sociology of scientific knowledge. He said that the exchange of ideas will lead to the establishment of a collective idea, and when it is fully developed, it will be divided into deep (professional) and popular (amateur) circles. In his preface to the 1979 edition of Fleck's book, Conne pointed out that he had read and believed in 1950 that someone had previously discovered my discovery in the history of science.

To Conne's direct reply, one theory is Sir Karl Popper 's falsificationism. It emphasizes the distinction between what is scientific or unscientific, and whether it can be falsified is the most important criterion. Connex also elaborated on positivism (verificationism) and appeared in the philosophical movement between positive philosophers in the 1920s. Implicit principles claim that meaningful statements must be supported through empirical or logical requirements.

Summary [ edit ]

Basic method [ edit ]

Comn’s research on the history of science and philosophy of science focuses on conceptual issues such as the practice of normal science, the impact of historical events, the emergence of scientific discoveries, the nature of the scientific revolution, and the process of scientific innovation. What kind of knowledge options and strategies are available to people over a period of time? What type of vocabulary and terminology are known and used to communicate in a particular period? This book emphasizes that scientific theory cannot be attributed to the importance of early research on traditional ideas, and that its development does not arise from the direct accumulation of facts but from a changing knowledge situation and possibilities. This approach is largely similar to the non-linear history of the school of history.

Historical example of chemistry [ edit ]

Conne illustrates his thoughts by taking examples from the history of science. For example, scientists of the eighteenth century believed that homogenous solutions were chemical compounds. Therefore, the mixture of water and alcohol is generally classified as a compound. Now that it is considered a solution, there is no reason to question whether it is a compound. Water and alcohol do not separate automatically and the distillation process does not separate completely (they are azeotropically mixed). Water and alcohol can be used in any combination. Under this paradigm, scientists believe that chemical reactions (such as a combination of water and alcohol) do not require a fixed ratio.

But this belief was finally overturned by Dalton 's atomic theory, which claims that atoms can only be combined in a simple, integer ratio. According to this new paradigm, reactions that do not occur at a fixed ratio cannot become chemical processes. In the scientific community, this type of worldview transition shows the paradigm shift that Conne calls.

Copernicus Revolution [ edit ]

A notable example of the revolution in scientific thinking was the Copernican revolution. The Ptolemaic school of thought, cycle, and the current round (some additional concepts) are used to simulate the operation of the planet, while the Earth is at a fixed center of its cosmology. With the improvement of the observation accuracy of celestial bodies, the periodicity of the Ptolemy School and the mechanism of the current round have to increase complexity in order to maintain the close relationship between the calculated planetary position and observation results. Copernicus proposes a model of the universe with the sun as the center and the earth rotating around the sun. For the movement of the simulated planet, Copernicus is also familiar with the method, but also the Ptolemy school cycle and the current round mechanism. However, compared to the Ptolemy model at that time, the Copernican model needed more cycles and rounds, and because of the lack of accurate calculations, his model could not have a more accurate prediction than the Ptolemy model. Copernican’s contemporaries rejected his view of the universe. Conne said that they were right to do this: Copernicus’s view of the universe lacked credibility.

Conne explains how the paradigm shift may take place later when Galileo introduces new ideas about the movement. Intuitively, when an object is in motion, it quickly stops. A well-made car can travel long distances before stopping, but unless it has been a cart, it will eventually stop moving. Aristotle once believed that this is probably the basic attribute of nature: the movement of an object can continue and must be continuously promoted. Given the knowledge available at the time, this represented reasonable thinking.

Galileo put forward a bold conjecture: Suppose he said that we have been observing the last stop moving objects, just because some friction has always occurred. Galileo does not have the equipment to objectively confirm his conjecture; but he believes that if there is no friction that slows down an object in motion, the inherent tendency of the object will maintain its speed without any additional force.

The cycle of use and the Ptolemy method of this round have exhausted: In the observed anomalies, the complexity they require is like mushrooms growing rapidly and endlessly. Kepler was the first person to give up Ptolemy paradigm. He began to explore the possibility of Mars having an elliptical orbit rather than a circular orbit. Obviously, the angular velocity cannot be constant, but it is very difficult to find the formula that describes the rate of change of the angular velocity of the planetary ball. After many years of calculations, Köpple has reached the second law of equal area that we now know . Galileo's conjecture only ends with conjecture, and Kopler's cosmology is also. But every guess increases each other's credibility, and then they together change the general opinion of the scientific community. Later, Sir Newton discovered that Köbler’s three laws can be derived from the theory of a single movement and planetary operation. Newton's paradigm shifts Galileo and Köppler's initiation, cohesion and integration.

Coherence [ edit ]

One of the goals of science is to find a number of models within a coherent framework, and these models interpret as many of the observations as possible. In short, Galileo's reflection on the movement and Kepler's view of the universe can present a coherent framework that is comparable to the Aristotle/Ptolemy framework.

一旦範式轉移已經發生，教科書會被重寫。通常科學史也會被重寫，而被表示成一個必然過程，主導現行潮流並確立思想框架。在這個確立框架中的普遍信念，若有迄今尚未詮釋的異常現象，會在恰當的時機被清楚地詮釋。孔恩指出，解謎過程在科學家職涯中佔據了大部分（如果不是全部）時間。他們很有韌勁的追求謎題的解答，因為既定範式之前的成功往往令人產生極大的信心，擔保了謎題的解答是存在的，儘管解答可能非常難以得到。而孔恩將這個過程稱為常態科學。

當某個範式已延展到它的極限，異常現象—以當前範式觀察到卻解釋失誤的現象—則開始累積。它們的重要性是由該學科的實踐人員判斷。有些異常現象可能被認為是觀察錯誤，有些只要求目前的範式小小地調整，在適當時機將會辨明。一些異常現象自動地消除了，加深了在這個研究方向的範式可用度。而無論有些異常現象很重大或有許多，孔恩指出，除非有其它可信的選擇方案提供，實踐的科學家並不會對已確立的範式失去信心；在範式擔保了問題存有解答卻失去求解的信心，實際意味著不再是一個科學家。

在任何一個科學社群，也有些個人比大多數更大膽。這些科學家判斷危機的存在，走上孔恩稱之為革新的科學，探索有無長期保持的，似乎更顯明的假設，那些替代的範式。對於既定的思想框架來說，有時這會產生一個競爭對手。新的候選範式將隨之有許多異常現象待解釋，部分是因為它仍然是全新和不完整的。孔恩強調，科學社群的主流應該而且也會反對任何觀念上的轉變。要充分發揮其潛力，科學社群需要含括保守的人和大膽的人。在科學史中有很多確立框架的可信想法，最終被證實的例子。要預測某個候選的新範式最終是否能解答異常現象，幾乎是不可能的。那些能洞察理論潛力的科學家們，他們很可能是首先轉移到，偏好挑戰性範式的那一群人。通常有如下的週期，其中有兩種範式的追隨者。隨時間推移，如果挑戰的範式凝聚而且條理一致了，它將取代舊範式，而範式轉移將會發生。

階段[編輯]

孔恩依照時間次序，將科學發展區分為不同的階段。

第一階段—範式出現以前的階段，只存在一次，其中沒有對任何特定理論的共識。這個階段的特點是某些不兼容和不完全的理論。因此，大多數的科學探索都有冗長的書籍形式，因為沒有公認為理所當然的事實主體。在範式出現以前的社群，如果其中活動成員終於傾向這些概念框架之一，而最後對合適方法的選項產生廣泛共識，那麼共通的術語和實驗方式，有助於提升洞察力。

第二階段—常態科學開始，在主導範式的理論脈絡中解決謎題。只要在學科內部有共識，常態科學就會繼續。隨著時間的推移，常態科學的進展可能顯示有異常現象：在現有範式的背景下難以解釋的事實。通常這些異常可被解決；在某些情況下它們會累積到使常態科學變得困難的點，並揭露出舊有範式中的弱點。

第三階段—如果範式理論長期無法解釋異常現象，科學社群進入到危機時期。危機通常在常態科學的理論脈絡中解決。然而，常態科學依據範式理論的重大努力失敗後，科學可能進入下一個階段。

第四階段—範式轉移或科學革命，是重新檢視該領域的基本假設並建立新範式的階段。

第五階段—革命後，新範式的主導地位建立，所以科學家回復到有常態科學，以新範式的理論脈絡來解決謎題。科學可以反復經歷這些週期；而孔恩指出對科學來說，這種不經常或不容易發生的轉移，是一件好事。

不可共量性[編輯]

根據孔恩說法，範式轉移前後的科學範式完全不同，所以它們的理論是不能互相比較的(incommensurable)—新範式無法以舊範式的規則來證明或反駁，反之亦然。（之後孔恩解釋「相稱的」和「無法相比較的」這兩個詞語，是指語義之間的區別，亦即他所謂相稱的陳述，可以完整地從一個語言翻譯到另一個；而在無法相比較的語言中，不可能進行嚴格的翻譯）範式轉移不僅涉及一個理論的修改或轉變，它改變了術語的定義方式，該領域的科學家如何看待他們的主題，以及，也許最重要的是，什麼樣的問題被認為是有效的，有什麼規則可用於確認特定理論的真實性。新理論並不只是延伸舊的理論，像科學家以前所想的那樣，而是全新替代的世界觀。這樣的不可共量性質，不僅存在於範式轉移之前和之後，而且存在於矛盾範式之間的時期。根據孔恩說法，根本不可能建立一個公正的語言，可以對於衝突範式之間來作中立比較。因為所用的術語是構成個別範式整體的必需部件，因此在每個範式中有不同的涵義。相互斥範式的擁護者處於一個難點：「雖然對方都想將其它範式以及其中問題，轉換成他習慣的科學範式說明，但兩方卻也不希望證實另一方的問題。範式之間的競爭，並不是通過證明就能解決的那種爭鬥。」不同範式的科學家最後都是各說各話。

孔恩說驗證者使用的機率式驗證，本質上就不能決斷理論之間的衝突，因為它們只屬於其所探究的範式。同樣地，意圖否證一項陳述的報告，將會落入它們原先想比較的範式其中之一，所以也不足以完成這項任務。根據孔恩說法，否證性的概念無助於理解科學何以如此發展。在科學實踐中，如果有其它被認為可行的替代理論，科學家將只考慮一種理論已經被否證的可能性。如果沒有，科學家將繼續堅持既定的概念框架。如果範式轉移發生了，教科書將被重寫以表明先前的理論已經被否證。在20世紀80年代和90年代，他進一步發展了關於不可共量性的想法。在他未發表的手稿「多元化的世界」中，孔恩引入了組概念的理論：一組相互關聯的概念，它們是科學發展一段時期中的特徵，在結構上與現代類比的組概念不同。這些不同的結構意味著事物和過程的不同「分類法」，並且分類法中的這種差異構成不可共量性。這個理論是堅定的自然主義論，並利用發展心理學「創立基於經驗與現實的一個準先驗理論」。

範式[編輯]

Kuhn's opinion on scientific progress[編輯]

影響[編輯]

物理學[編輯]

社會學[編輯]

經濟學[編輯]

政治科學[編輯]

評論[編輯]

典範概念[編輯]

典範的不可共量性[編輯]

不可共量性及感知[編輯]

Awards and honors[編輯]

版本[編輯]

參見[編輯]

註解[編輯]

參考資料[編輯]

. T. S. 庫恩著，李寶恆、紀樹立譯，《科學革命的結構》上海：上海科學技術出版社， 1980。

. 孔恩著，程樹德、傅大衛、王道遠、錢永祥譯，《科學革命的結構》，臺北：遠流出版社，1989 初版， 1994 年二版。

. 托馬斯・庫恩著，金吾倫、胡新和譯，《科學革命的結構》北京：北京大學出版社， 2003。

外部連結[編輯]

Kuhn, Thomas - Wiki in Library and Information Science^{[失效連結]}

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